Comments on: Spime Networks and the future of Intelligence Collection http://metasecurity.wordpress.com/2009/07/30/spime-networks-and-the-future-of-intelligence-collection/ Security of Virtual Worlds Wed, 16 Jun 2010 22:22:08 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.com/ By: Augmented Reality Security Considerations « MetaSecurity http://metasecurity.wordpress.com/2009/07/30/spime-networks-and-the-future-of-intelligence-collection/#comment-5760 Augmented Reality Security Considerations « MetaSecurity Wed, 11 Nov 2009 17:04:49 +0000 http://metasecurity.net/?p=276#comment-5760 [...] the importance of location, physical threats become more relevant.  Users with mobile devices, acting as sensors, promote the dissemination of location relevant information.  As such, an individual targeting [...] [...] the importance of location, physical threats become more relevant.  Users with mobile devices, acting as sensors, promote the dissemination of location relevant information.  As such, an individual targeting [...]

]]> By: InfoBore 22 « ubiwar . conflict in n dimensions http://metasecurity.wordpress.com/2009/07/30/spime-networks-and-the-future-of-intelligence-collection/#comment-5683 InfoBore 22 « ubiwar . conflict in n dimensions Tue, 04 Aug 2009 22:24:22 +0000 http://metasecurity.net/?p=276#comment-5683 [...] Spime Networks and the Future of Intelligence Collection – Roderick Jones, MetaSecurity [...] [...] Spime Networks and the Future of Intelligence Collection – Roderick Jones, MetaSecurity [...]

]]> By: Michael R. http://metasecurity.wordpress.com/2009/07/30/spime-networks-and-the-future-of-intelligence-collection/#comment-5682 Michael R. Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:05:18 +0000 http://metasecurity.net/?p=276#comment-5682 The capability to remotely activate the microphone in a cell phone has long existed making the device in essence a listening post. It was recently demonstrated (GhostNet) that third-parties half-way around the world can install malware (trojan) which will remotely control an unwitting user's computer including the communication devices. The energy companies are installing "smart" meters at residential users which are hardware devices designed to remotely communicate real-time to the operations center. The obvious threat from active as opposed to passive nodes in a network will be determined as always by the legal limitations (Title III) for use in the public sector, and business models which are acceptable to end-users in the private sector. The remaining question is how much abusive activity will take place "off the radar" which is probably answered by how much money can be made illicitly in the private sector, and how much intelligence can be effectively collected by the public sector, including non-state actors. The capability to remotely activate the microphone in a cell phone has long existed making the device in essence a listening post. It was recently demonstrated (GhostNet) that third-parties half-way around the world can install malware (trojan) which will remotely control an unwitting user’s computer including the communication devices. The energy companies are installing “smart” meters at residential users which are hardware devices designed to remotely communicate real-time to the operations center.

The obvious threat from active as opposed to passive nodes in a network will be determined as always by the legal limitations (Title III) for use in the public sector, and business models which are acceptable to end-users in the private sector. The remaining question is how much abusive activity will take place “off the radar” which is probably answered by how much money can be made illicitly in the private sector, and how much intelligence can be effectively collected by the public sector, including non-state actors.

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